BRITTAIN v. ROSSITER.

RECENT

ENGLISH

High Court of Justice.

DECISIONS.

Court of Appeal.

BRITTAIN v. ROSSITER.
The plaintiff entered the defendant's service under a verbal contract for a year,
to commence two days after the day on which the contract was made. Before
the expiration of the year, the defendant dismissed him. To an action for
wrongful dismissal, the defendant pleaded the Statute of Frauds. Held, that the
verbal contract was not made absolutely void by the Statute of Frauds, s. 4, but
was an existing contract, though not enforceable ; no new contract could, consequently, be implied from any acts done under such an existing contract ; and the
principles of equity, as to part performance, in contracts relating to land, were
not to be extended to contracts relating to other matters.
Carrington v. Roots, 2 M. & V. 248, and Reade v. Lamb, 6 Exch. 130, commented on; Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield, I C., M. & R. 20, followed.

THIs was an action for wrongful dismissal, and the defendant
pleaded the Statute of Frauds
'At the trial, before HAWKINS, J., and a common jury, the plaintiff stated that he had three interviews with the defendant, on
Tuesday, the 17th, Thursday, the 19th, and Saturday, the 21st
of April; that the hiring was discussed at all three interviews, and
that on the 21st of April it was arranged that the plaintiff should
enter into the defendant's service for a year, at the rate of 1701.
per annum for the first and 2001. per annum for the second halfyear, and that his duties should commence on Monday, the 23d
of April.
On the 23d of April, the plaintiff entered into the defendant's
service, and was employed for several months; but before the
expiration of a year, the defendant dismissed the plaintiff, without
notice, giving him one month's salary in lieu of notice.
On this evidence, HAWKINS, J., held that the contract was complete on Saturday, April 21st, and was one not to be performed
within a year, and directed a verdict for the defendant.
The Exchequer Division (KELLY, C. B., and HAWKINS, J.)

refused a rule for a new trial, and the Court of Appeal (BRETT,
COTTON and THESIGER, L.JJ.) refused a rule on the grounds of the

contract not being within the Statute of Frauds, and that some
conversation, which took place on Monday, the 23d, between the
plaintiff and the defendant, amounted to a contract on that day;
but granted a rule nisi ibr a new trial, on the ground that there
had been a part performance of the contract, so as to take the case
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out of the Statute of Frauds, and also on the ground that there
was evidence of a hiring independently of the Statute of Frauds.
Lawrance, Q. 0., and Hutchins, for the defendant, showed
cause.-You cannot imply a contract when an express contract is
in existence. Snelling v. Lord Buntngfield, 1 0., M. & R. 20,
is on all fours with this case, and has been followed by Giraud v.
BiA1mond, 2 0. B. 835; Leroux v. Brown, 12 0.B. 801; Banks
v. Crossland, Law Rep. 10 Q. B. 97; Appleby v. 7ohnson, Law
Rep. 9 0. P. 158.
Bottomley Firth, for the plaintiff, in support of the rule.-The
dicta of the judges in Carrirgtonv. Roots, 2 M. & W. 248, show
that this contract was void absolutely, and then a new contract can
be implied: Beade v. Lamb, 6 Exch. 130; Inman v. Stamp, 1
Stark. N. P. 12; Thomas v. Williams, 10 B. & 0. 664; Pairman
v. Oakford, 5 Hurlst. & N. 635; Beaston v. Uollyer, 4 Bing. 309.
As to part performance-Attorney- General v. Day, I Yes. Sr.
218; Bond v. Hopkins, 1 Sch. & Lef. 413
L. J.-I
am of opinion, after due consideration, that
this rule must be discharged. It seems to me that it was proved,
beyond the capability of contradiction, that there was on Saturday,
April 21st, an express contract of service for a year, which year
was commenced on the Monday, and that, therefore, that express
contract was within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds; that
is to say, that it was a contract, but, being only verbal and not
written, it was a contract upon which neither party could maintain
an action so as to charge the other.
It was suggested that, inasmuch as the plaintiff did on Monday
enter, and continue for some time, in the defendant's service, we
must, from his so doing, imply another contract to serve for a
year, which contract would be subject to the same conditions as
the original contract, but would not be within the Statute of
Frauds; and it was said that we can imply that contract from
what was done, because the first contract was void absolutely.
In the first place, I think, on the true view of the case, that it
is not right to say that the first contract is void absolutely, because
it is within the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds. There is a
contract, but no person can be charged upon it in a court of law.
If the original contract still exists, then, it seems to me, you canBRETT,
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not, from the acts done in the performance of that contract, imply
a new contract. Those acts were done by the parties as a part
performance of the actual, existing contract, and not with any
intention of acting under another contract, and it would be drawing a wrong inference to say that from those acts you can infer
that the parties intended another contract. I think that the proposition cannot be controverted, that no other contract can be
implied from the acts done than the original contract, because
there was the original contract, which was an express contract, in
existence. All that can be said is that no action can be maintained for a breach of that express contract, for the statute prevents any one being charged on such a contract when not in
writing. That is the whole effect of section 4.
Cases were cited to show the contrary, and the cases of Carrington v. Roots and Reade v. Lamb were most relied on, and it was
said that there were in those cases judicial declarations that the
contract was absolutely void, because it had not been reduced into
writing; but it must be observed that those declarations were not
necessary for the decision of the cases in which they occur. What
was really decided in those cases was, it being admitted you could
not charge a person directly on the contract because it was not in
writing, no more could you do so indirectly, and that you could
not rely on the contract in any cause of action which necessitated
the admission of the validity of that contract-that is to say, of its
binding force in a. court of law. There were no doubt phrases
used in those cases, which are relied on as saying that the contract
is absolutely void, but those cases were considered in Leroux v.
Brown, by Lord Chief Justice JERVIS and Mr. Justice MAULE,
and they took the same view of this case as I have now attempted
to express, and gave a clear decision (and one which was necessary
for the case before them), that a contract expressly made in words,
which is within the 4th section, is not void because it has not been
reduced into writing, but only that it cannot be enforced, nor anything depending on it, in an English court of law.
Snelling v. Lord Runtingfield, which has never been overruled,
and which is strongly, to my mind, supported by Leroux v. Brown,
is directly in point in the present case, and seems to me to have
been rightly decided.
I am of opinion, therefore, on that point, that the contract was
not void absolutely, but was existing, and as it was existing, from
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the acts done in performance of it, you cannot imply any other
contract.
The misfortune for the plaintiff in this case is, that he was
obliged to insist that he had a hiring for a year, and the only way
he could prove that was by being enabled to rely on the contract
into which he entered on the Saturday. He cannot rely on that
in consequence of the Statute of Frauds, and so he cannot maintain an action on that view of the case.
Then it was said that, as there was part performance, we might
look at the contract, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, and
that we could do so, because we must now act on the same principles as existed in courts of equity before the Judicature Act. Now,
we know that in certain cases of part performance with regard to
contracts for the purchase of lands, the equity courts have looked
at the evidence to see what the contract was with regard to that
land, though there was no contract in writing; but the application
of that principle in equity was confined to questions only upon
contracts relating to lands. They did not apply the principle to
such a contract as the present.
I will say no more as to the decisions in equity, with regard to
contracts relating to land, than that I think they were bold decisions, having regard to the Statute of Frauds. The principle was
never applied to a contract like this before the Judicature Act was
passed. Can it be now, after the passing of the Judicature Act?
It seems to me the right construction with regard to the application in common-law courts of the principles of equity is, that the
Judicature Act gives no one any right which he had not before,
either in law or equity courts, because if it does it alters the rights
of people; whereas, I venture to say the Judicature Act alters no
rights-it only transfers procedures. If that is a true proposition,
before this act was passed no one could be charged on a contract
like the present, either in equity or law; if by reason of an
attempt to apply some abstract principle of equity to this case, we
were to enable a person to enforce this contract, we should enable
him now to do that which no one could have done before, either in
law or equity.
COTTON, L. J.-I
think this rule must be discharged. It was
argued that, though the contract was not enforceable, because of
the 4th section of the Statute of Frauds, yet that there was, under
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the circumstances, an implied contract, and it was attempted to
take the case out of the rule which lays down that you cannot
imply a contract with reference to matters as to which there
existed an express contract, by saying that the effect of the 4th
section of the Statute of Frauds is to make that express contract
absolutely void.
I am of opinion that that is not a fair construction of the section. The courts of equity construed the section not as making
the contract void, but only as making evidence of such contracts
void, and, under certain circumstances, they dispensed with anything required by the Statute of Frauds, considering that certain
other matters were sufficient to justify them in looking at evidence
not ordinarily allowed to be shown. Carrington v. Roots and
Reede v. Lamb are both cases with dicta of the judges, tending to show that section 4 makes the contract void altogether, but
I think there is a passage in the judgments which explains what is
meant. In Carringtonv. Roots the action was brought by a party
who had purchased by a verbal contract a growing crop of grass,
with liberty to go on the close wherein it grew for the purpose of
cutting and carrying it away, and it was held that he could not
maintain trespass against the seller for taking a-way the horse and
cart from the close, for the action was, in substance, one charging
the defendant on the -contract within section 4 of the Statute of
Frauds. Lord ABINGER says, "Whenever an action is brought on
the assumption that the contract is good in law, that seems to me
to be, in effect, an action on the contract. If the whole transaction between the parties were set forth in the declaration, the
contract would form part of it, and, in effect, the plaintiff now
says that the defendant ought not.to take his cart, because it was
lawfully there under that contract. This is a collateral and incidental mode of enforcing the contract, though it is not directly
sued on." Mr. Baron PARKE says, "I think this is an averment
of a binding contract for the sale of the crop, with a right to enter
on the land in order to take the crop. The contract being void by
the statute, the action cannot be maintained." And when he says
a "void" contract, he means it is not a contract that one party
could, as a matter of right, enforce against the other. In Reade
v. Lamb the question was whether certain pleas were properly
pleaded, and the judges say that for this purpose the 4th and 17th
sections are the same.
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I am of opinion that under the statute the verbal contract made
on Saturday, April 21st, was an existing contract, but was unenforceable.
Then it was said that even if there is no implied contract, yet'
the original contract may, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds,
be now enforced in this court in consequence of the part performance, and that that principle can be applied now since the passing
of the Judicature Act. The first thing necessary to consider as to
that is, what is the doctrine of part performance? It is argued
that as a rule the governing principle of the courts of equity was
that they would not allow the Statute of Frauds to be made use of
to defraud another; but that is not really the fall principle; if it
had been so, the case of a man who had received the purchasemoney for lands, and refused to convey those lands, would come
within the principle, but it is clear that the receipt of 20,0001.
under a verbal contract will not, without more, enable the person
who has paid that money to enforce the contract; and yet what
could be more to another's fraud than that ?
The real principle is this: when the equity courts found a man
in possession of land where, if there was no contract, he would be
a trespasser, then, taking such possession as being strong evidence
of ownership of the land, they implied a contract, and said we will
allow the parties to go into evidence to show what the real circumstances were under which the land was held. That being so, can
that principle be applied to the present case ? It is said that it
can be by virtue of the Judicature Act, section 24, sub-sections 4,
7, which enables any court of common law to enforce those rights
which equity expressly enforced without sending the party there.
The intent and object of the act was to constitute one court, to
deal with all matters in dispute between the parties, without sending them from one court to another. I agree with Lord Justice
BRETT, that it was not intended by the Judicature Act to give any
new rights to parties, but simply to enable the court to deal with
all the rights that had been previously dealt with in equity. The
doctrine of part performance in equity has been confined to actions
,relating to lands, and that being so, I think we ought not on any
vague notion, to interfere on equitable principles to give to persons
a right which they would not have had previously to the passing of
tue Judicature Act, or to apply the doctrine of part performance to
VOL. XX
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cases in which equity would not have applied it, and in which
equity never interfered.
THsIErs
, L. J.-There are two questions raised in this case.
The first is whether the plaintiff can maintain his action at common law, and the second is, if he cannot do so, whether he can by
reason of the equitable doctrine of part performance.
I feel reluctantly constrained to an opinion that he cannot in
either way. I say, "reluctantly," for it appears to me manifestly
unjust, that where a contract of hiring has been acted on, and one
party has had, to a great extent, the benefit of the contract, that
that party can put an end to that contract at any time he thinks
convenient, without giving any notice to the other party, and I
should have been glad to hold here that the party who has entered
upon the contract of service, and has acted upon it, at all events,
at the very least, is entitled to reasonable notice before such service
could be terminated.
As regards the right to maintain this action at common law, it
is admitted that the contract between the parties was finally settled
on the Saturday, the 21st of April: and it is not in dispute that
if the contract was concluded on that day, that it was a contract
within section 4 of the Statute of Frauds. The question then
arises, What is the effect of that statute on such a contract? Is
it, as was contended by Mr. Firth, that the contract would be
swept away altogether, and does not, therefore, stand in the way of
proof of another contract? or is it a contract still in existence,
though it cannot be enforced by action on the part of the plaintiff?
There is no doubt that there are expressions to be found in the
cases to which our attention has been called, from which it might
be inferred that several judges were of opinion that such a contract
was absolutely void under section 4 of the Statute of Frauds, but
I think even if the cases are looked at by themselves, it is clear
that it was not necessary for the purposes of those cases to decide
if the contract was absolutely void; and certainly, if you look
aside from those cases to the other cases cited, it is clear that there
have been distinct decisions, where the point was necessary to be
dcided, to the effect that a contract is not absolutely void under the
4th section, and really when one looks at the statute itself it seems
impossible to hold that the contract can be absolutely void. If the
words of the 4th section clearly point to no more than this, that ne
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action shall be brought on the contract, and that it is not absolutely void, it is clear from this that, while no action can be maintained against one of the parties to the contract, supposing he did
not sign it, it may be the case, on the other hand, that another
party, having signed it, may have an action brought against him.
Obviously, therefore, it may be void as against one party while it
is enforceable against the other.
The arguments in Carrington v. Boots and Reade v. Lamb
were pointed to this, that, though there is a difference in the
language of the 4th and 17th sections, yet, in reality, the result of
these two sections, as regards contracts within them, is the same;
but, if that be so, it by no means follows that, even under the 17th
section, the contract is void for all purposes. On the other hand,
I think it is clear that it is not void for all purposes, and it is a
real existing contract, though not enforceable, for this reason, that
the statute in the 17th section provides that part performance shall
enable the contract to be enforced. Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield,
which has never been overruled, is a distinct decision on the point
we have to decide, and has been followed in several cases.
When a contract is not enforceable within the Statute of Frauds
it is still an existing contract, and the result of it being an existing contract is that there can be no implied contract while that
express contract is in existence; and though it may be hard on a
person who has been a party to such a contract that he can in no
way enforce either the express or any implied contract, yet if we
follow Snelling v. Lord Huntingfield the law is so laid down, and
we are bound by it.
The result is that, there being in the present case an express
contract on Saturday, April 21st, not enforceable as within the
Statute of Frauds, the plaintiff cannot maintain an action on that
contract, and, on the other hand, he cannot maintain one on an
implied contract.
It has been said that, though there cannot be a recovery on an
executory contract where there is no memorandum to satisfy the
Statute of Frauds, yet if the contract had been executed to the
extent of a man going into the service, and of the other getting
the benefit of that service, there can be a recovery in respect of
the service so rendered; and I must confess that if the matter were
res integra, and we were not bound by the authorities, I should
have great difficulty in seeing why we should not hold that a man
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could recover in respect of such service, anA why we should no
equally maintain the proposition that he could not be turned ou
of the service without a reasonable notice, such as implied by law
or contemplated by the parties. But the contrary is decided in
Snelling v. Lord Hfuntingfield.
Then it is said that in equity, notwithstanding the Statute of
Frauds, where there has been, with reference to contracts relating
to lands, an entry upon the land and a part performance of the
contract in that respect, a court of equity may look to see what that
act really represented-in other words, what was the contract to
which that act was to be referred? I must confess I see no reason
or principle why, where there has been an entry upon a service
under a contract of hiring, the equity doctrine should not equally
apply, and why we should not, in the same way, look to see what
is referable, and (just as the principle of equity is founded on
this, that, notwithstanding the statute, equity will not allow fraud
on a party who has been induced to change his position), why
should we not also act on that principle in a case of entry upon
service. But at the same time I feel that these doctrines relating
to part performance are doctrines which are not to be extended,
and that we ought not, at all events, at this late period, to go
beyond what the courts have distinctly decided as the principle;
and though if we could clearly see that the principles which are
applied with regard to contracts relating to land are to be or might
be applied to cases of contracts of hiring of service, I think there
is nothing in section 24 of the Judicature Act which would prevent our holding that that principle is to be applied; yet I do
think that the fact of equity never having applied this principle to
this kind of cases, is, at all events, sufficient to bind us to say that
equity has not considered that the principle ought to be extended.
For these reasons I concur in holding that the decision of the
court below was right, and ought to be affirmed.
Rule nisi discharged.
In America also, the weight of anthority is that an oral contract to labor
for more than a year is not taken out
of the operation of the statute, by a
mere partial performance by the person
employed, so that he can recover for
a wrongful dismissal before the time expires; whatever may be the effect of

part performance in contracts relating
to land. And Ihis is so, whether the
statute, as is sometimes the case, expressly declares the contract "void,"
or merely enacts that C1 no action shall
be brought upon it." In neither case
is there any exception made by reason
of part performance, as there is in the
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section relating to the sale of goods, quantum mneruit; because the spirit of
&e. The fact that such exception is the statute is that the contract shall not
made in one section of the statute, and be enforced or set up in a court of jusomitted in another, is sufficient proof tice. See King v. Welcome, 5 Gray 41 ;
Comes v. Lamson, 16 Conn. 246; Tague
that it was not intended to so extend
it ; and, although courts of equity have v. Hayward, 25 Ind. 428; Scotten v.
allowed such effect to partial per- Brown, 4 Harring. 324 ; Finchv. Finch,
10 Ohio St. 507. Whether he could
formance in contracts for the sale of
real estate, yet courts of law do not commence a suit before the expiration
incline to extend such exception to of the time fixed by the contract is nft
any other cases. Comes v. Lamson, 16 so clear. See Clark v. Terry, 25 Conn.
Conn. 246. See the subject examined in 395.
But, perhaps, the main question is
Marcy v. Jfarcy, 9 Allen 8. And the
argument leads to the conclusion that not yet fully settled, since some reeven complete performance by the la- spectable authorities are the other way,
borer, will not render the contract so notably the decisions in Vermont.
far valid, that the laborer could sue See Philbrook v. Belknap, 6 Vt. 383:
Mfack v. Bragg, 30 Id. 571 ; where it
upon the original contract, and recover
for his labor according to the contract was distinctly held that the laborer
price : Emery v. Smith, 46 N. H. 151. could not recover anything for partial
But of course the laborer might recover performance, the contract being entire,
upon a quantum meruit, where he has and the plaintiff bound by it, though
served the entire time ; and doubtless oral. But they seem to us to take too
the contract price agreed to by the em- limited a view of the spirit and inployer is admissible against him as tend- tention of the statute. It is true the
ing to show the value of the services ; statute merely says, that "no action
not as a contract, but as an admission. shall be brought upon it," &c., and it is
See McGlucky v. Bitter, I E. D. Smith true in one sense, no action is brought
618; Nones v. Homer, 2 Hilt. 116; upon it when it is merely set up to defeat
Sims v. McEwen, 27 Ala. 184; Bay v. another action. But does not the statute
mean that no such contract shall be
Young, 13 Tex. 550. And probably if
the plaintiff had fully performed his enforced in a court of justice, and no
contract with the defendant's consent, rights established by it ? If a plaintiff
and should sue on a quantum ,ueruit, he sues for goods bargained and sold, could
could recover no more at most than a defendant plead by way of set-off,
the contract price ; for the contract that the plaintiff had orally agreed to
might regulate the amount or value labor for him for more than a year,
of the services, even if the action and had not fulfilled his contract, by
was not specifically upon it, but only for which he owed him more than the value
work and labor generally: Van Palken- of the goods? And yet he would not
burgh v. Croffert, 7 N. Y. Weekly Dig. be bringing any action on his contract,
164 (1877). Whether a laborer could but only defeating another's action by
recover anything for partial perform- setting it up. This would be adhering
ance of such a contract, if he wilfully to the letter at the expense of the spirit,
and sacrificing the substance to the
leaves before the time expires is not
fully agreed. Some cases hold that the shadow.
EDUND H. BENNETT.
eontlact can not be set up against a
plaintiff to def-at his recovery upon a

